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COMMENTS
ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY TO THE THIRD
PARTY AND PUBLIC POLICY: A
CALABRESI APPROACH
by Thomas E. Bilek
CCORDING to certain courts the liability of accountants to third
parties arises from a balancing of public and private interests.' The
balance as outlined by these courts imposes liability only when the
imposition of such liability will serve the public interest. 2 Some recent deci-
sions3 follow the lead of many law commentators 4 and state that public pol-
icy considerations demand that accountants be held liable to all foreseeable
third parties for injuries caused by the accountants' negligent acts. 5
1. Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D.R.I. 1968) (noting policy ques-
tions of justifiable reliance, risk spreading, and insurance); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395,
401 (Iowa 1969) (social utility rationale for privity requirement not reasonable); Aluma Kraft
Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 383 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (privity analysis
involves a balancing of several factors); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d
138, 147 (1983) (liability depends on whether the public interest will be served); Shatterproof
Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971, writ refd
n.r.e.) (relying on Rusch Factors in its holding); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co.,
113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (1983) (liability depends on public policy).
2. See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 93 (D.R.I. 1968) (liability
imposed after noting policy factors favoring imposition); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J.
324, 461 A.2d 138, 153 (1983) (public interest served by imposing liability); Citizens State
Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (1983) (public policy
demands imposing liability absent special facts).
3. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983); Citizens State Bank v.
Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1981).
4. See, e.g., Besser, Privity? An Obsolete Approach to the Liability ofAccountants to Third
Parties, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 507, 541-42 (1976); Bradley, Auditor's Liability and the Need
for Increased Accounting Uniformity, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 898, 921 (1965); Solomon,
Ultramares Revisited: A Modern Study of Accountants' Liability to the Public, 18 DE PAUL L.
REV. 56 (1968); Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negli-
gent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233, 259-60 (1983); Wyatt, Auditors'Responsi-
bilities, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 331, 331-32 (1968); Comment, Accountants' Liabilities to Third
Parties under Common Law and Federal Securities Law, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 137,
149 (1967); Comment, Public Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Party, 47
NOTRE DAME LAW. 588, 608 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Third Party]; Comment,
Auditors' Responsibility for Misrepresentation: Inadequate Protection for Users of Financial
Statements, 44 WASH. L. REV. 139, 177 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Inadequate
Protection]; Note, Accountants' Liabilities for False and Misleading Financial Statements, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1437, 1468-69 (1967).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1981) defines "negligent misrepresenta-
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This Comment asserts that courts that have held accountants liable to all
foreseeable third parties have not adequately considered the relevant public
policy implications 6 of their decisions. The decisions imposing liability
merely analyze a number of questionably relevant factors. 7 No underlying
economic methodology exists to justify the use of these factors or the results
their use produces.8
An alternative analysis suggested in this Comment approaches the ques-
tion of liability by determining the most efficient allocation of society's re-
sources. This approach considers whether imposing liability to third parties
results in a greater maximization of scarce resources than failing to impose
such liability. Problems of determining the nature, standards, and extent of
liability, and the proper application to large and small corporations compli-
cate the solution.
The imposition upon an accountant of liability to all foreseeable persons
for damages caused by his negligence is not economically or legally9 justifi-
able. Generally, a more efficient allocation of resources results when ac-
countants are not liable to any third party for their negligence. In other
words, the accountant should have no duty to tbird persons to render an
audit devoid of negligent mistakes, but only to refrain from making inten-
tional misrepresentations. 10 This position, although admittedly contrary to
current interpretations, both deters the accountant from making financial
misrepresentations and maximizes society's resources. Resolving the issue of
accountant liability to third parties requires an analysis of certain back-
ground information, including the scope of the accountant's function and
judicial decisions and rationales.
tion" by a professional as the failure "to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information" for the guidance of others in business transactions.
The commentators generally argue for expanded liability because they believe that the ac-
counting profession is best able to bear the loss and that the negligent accountant should bear
the loss instead of the innocent reliant party. Ebke, In Search of Alternatives: Comparative
Reflections on Corporate Governance and the Independent Auditor's Responsibilities (to be pub-
lished in 79 Nw. U.L. REV. (Dec. 1984)); see Besser, supra note 4, at 523, n.70; Wiener, supra
note 4, at 252.
6. "Public policy" is a nebulous concept. In this Comment public policy considerations
are (1) the maximization of society's scarce resources and (2) fairness. Liability should be
imposed upon a party only if it is the most efficient and fair solution.
7. See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90-91 (D.R.I. 1968) (three
factors); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 139, 147, 150-53 (1983) (listing
various policy considerations); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376,
335 N.W.2d 361, 365-66 (1983) (same); see also infra notes 27-64 and accompanying text (dis-
cussion of the policy factors and underlying rationales of courts' decisions).
8. A few authorities have developed methodologies for imposing liability. See G. CALA-
BREsi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS-A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) [hereinafter
cited as CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS]; R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d
ed. 1977); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW AND ECON. 1 (1960). These commen-
tators attempt to develop a strategy for determining who should be liable, based on economic
principles of maximizing society's resources.
9. Absent an economic or fairness justification no legal justification exists for imposing
liability. See CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 8, at 24.
10. Negating accountant liability for intentional misrepresentation, however, would not
result in a more efficient allocation. "Intent," as defined in criminal law, includes a reckless




A. The Nature of the Accountant's Task
Accounting is the art of identifying, measuring, recording, and communi-
cating financial information concerning an economic unit.II The independ-
ent accountant analyzes pertinent information provided by the client
company. By scrutinizing this information the accountant attempts to cre-
ate statements' 2 that accurately reflect the company's financial position.' 3
The accountant's ultimate objective is to certify that the resulting financial
statement fairly represents the "financial position, results of operations, and
changes in financial position in conformity with generally accepted account-
ing principles."' 14
Several difficulties exist in fairly representing a company's financial posi-
tion. The accountant may choose from a multitude of acceptable accounting
procedures.' 5 Ideally, the accountant uses the procedure that will most ac-
curately reflect the company's financial position. 16 The accountant must
11. W. PYLE & J. WHITE, FUNDAMENTAL ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 1 (6th ed. 1972).
12. The basic financial statements generally required are: (1) statement of financial posi-
tion; (2) statement of operations (income statement); (3) statement of changes in financial posi-
tion-statement of inflows and outflows of funds; and (4) supporting schedules essential for
full disclosure. G. WELSCH, C. ZLATKOVICH & W. HARRISON, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNT-
ING 34 (5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING].
13. Professor Fiflis states the accountant's function as follows: (1) preliminary fact-find-
ing to familiarize the accountant with the nature of the client's business, its operations, and
organization; (2) determining the specific audit procedure that will be used; (3) performing the
audit; (4) reporting the findings. Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to
Third Parties, 28 VAND. L. REV. 31, 35-42 (1975).
14. 1 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, Statements on Auditing Standards § 110.01
(1972) [hereinafter cited as AICPA, Statement on Auditing Standards]. Similarly, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission requires that the audit be in accordance with generally ac-
cepted auditing standards. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-03 (1984). The accounting profession generally
regulates itself through three organizations: The American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants (AICPA), the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and the American
Accounting Association. INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING, supra note 12, at 5. The SEC has
broad statutory authority to regulate virtually all aspects of the issuance and sale of securities
in interstate commerce, but has generally declined to use the full extent of that authority.
Instead, the SEC relies on the accounting profession to define and enforce professional ac-
counting standards and to regulate itself. Id. at 8. An accountant, therefore, must comply
with the generally accepted accounting principles as defined by his profession in order to avoid
negligence. See id. at 8.
Federal securities laws require an annual audit for many companies. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aa, 77g
(1981). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that independent certified financial
statements be included in the annual reports for most companies having assets of $1,000,000
and 500 holders or more of a class of equity securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78(l)(g)(l) (1981).
15. The many choices that confront an accountant in determining an accounting proce-
dure may unfairly trap him. If he chooses a descriptive technical procedure, the statement
may grow incomprehensible, conferring negligence upon the accountant. If he chooses a less
technical alternative, he may not sufficiently portray the company's financial condition, and
again the accountant is negligent. See Comment, Auditors' Third Party Liability: An Ill-Con-
sidered Extension of the Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 675, 692 n.76 (1971).
16. Accounting may be more of an art than a science. Minow, Accountants'Liability and
the Litigation Explosion, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Sept. 1984, at 70, 78; see also Comment, supra
note 15, at 691-92. While endeavoring to reflect adequately the company's financial position in
the statement, the accountant cannot possibly find every imaginable mistake or deception.
Negligence results when the accountant fails to choose the proper standards that would cor-
rectly reflect the company's financial position. See H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324,
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also convey this information in an understandable and nondeceptive man-
ner. 17 Words of art peculiar to the accounting profession complicate the
reporting duty.18 Accountants, therefore, must make their language under-
standable to the frequent nonaccountant users of such information. 19
Originally, the purpose of the audit was to inform management of irregu-
larities and inefficiencies in the business. 20 Although this remains a principal
reason for conducting audits, the accounting profession has become increas-
ingly aware of third-party reliance on audited financial statements. 2' This
reliance by so many different groups requires that the accountant be in-
dependent.22 An accountant is expected to represent each interest by play-
ing the role of watchdog, thus enabling each interested person to detect
whether his interest is in jeopardy.23
Accountants provide necessary services to society. 24 By arbitrating all the
varied interests represented in a financial statement, an accountant main-
tains the orderly flow of the free market system. Without the independent
accountant, every interested party would be forced to make a separate au-
dit.25 This repetition of effort would needlessly expend societal resources. 26
B. The Judicial Positions
Two cases best exemplify the conflicting precedent for extending liability
for breach of contract to third parties. 27 These cases, Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche28 and Glanzer v. Shephard,29 were both decided by Judge Cardozo
more than fifty years ago.3 0 In each case Judge Cardozo grappled with ex-
461 A.2d 138, 148 (1983). Difficulties abound in making the determination of negligence. 1
AICPA, Statements on Auditing Standards, supra note 14, § 203.
17. See 1 AICPA, Statements on Auditing Standards, supra note 14, § 430.
18. An example is the term "credit." Most nonaccountants almost certainly would not
guess that the term "credit" refers to the amounts representing the liabilities and equity of a
business enterprise. Most nonaccountants would also not realize that "deferred credit" means
the received-but-unearned revenue.
19. Comment, supra note 15, at 687-90.
20. See Comment, Accountants' Liability for Negligence-A Contemporary Approach for a
Modern Profession, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 404-05 (1979); Comment, Inadequate Protec-
tion, supra note 4, at 178.
21. In 1957 the Securities and Exchange Commission stated that "[t]he responsibility of a
public accountant is not only to the client who pays his fee, but also to investors, creditors and
others who may rely on the financial statements which he certifies." In re Touche, Niven,
Bailey, & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670 (1957).
22. Id. at 671.
23. One commentator has explained the watchdog function in greater detail. Ebke, supra
note 5.
24. See J. CAREY, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 14 (1946).
25. Id.
26. Id. Additionally, the endless doubts, delays, misunderstandings, and controversies
arising from multiple audits would result in further considerable expense. Id.
27. For an extended current case development, see Gormley, The Foreseen, the Foresee-
able, and Beyond-Accountants' Liability to Nonclients, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 528, 531-58
(1984). For a good case development without Rosenblum or Citizens, see Besser, supra note 4,
at 510-31.
28. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
29. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
30. Courts addressing accountant liability discuss both cases. Rusch Factors, Inc. v.
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tending liability for economic harm beyond the privity of contract. In
Glanzer the court allowed recovery by the third party,31 but the court in
Ultramares denied third-party recovery in an apparently analogous
situation. 32
In Glanzer the defendants operated public scales and certified the weight
of beans to establish a contract purchase price. The sellers arranged for a
copy of the report certifying the weight of the beans to be sent to the plain-
tiff-buyers. The plaintiffs, upon resale of the beans, discovered that the re-
port overstated the weight of the beans. Although the court recognized the
absence of a contractual relationship between the parties, it nevertheless
ruled that the defendant-certifiers owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs. 33 The
defendant's knowledge of the prospective use of their weight certification
expanded this duty. Since the defendants knew that others would rely on
their service, the court established a duty to protect the third-party
interests. 34
Judge Cardozo reached a seemingly opposite result nine years later in his
Ultramares decision.35 In this case the defendant public accounting firm
contracted to prepare and certify a balance sheet and released an audit with
the customary certification. 36 The accountants knew, as did the weighers in
Glanzer, that third parties would rely on their representations. 37 Yet the
court held that negligent preparation and certification of the financial state-
ments did not give rise to accountant liability beyond contract privity.38 The
court attempted to distinguish Glanzer by noting that the certification in
Glanzer was intended for the ultimate use of third parties, whereas the pri-
Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90-91 (D.R.I. 1968); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461
A.2d 138, 154 (1983).
31. 135 N.E. at 277.
32. 174 N.E. at 449-50.
33. 135 N.E. at 275-76.
34. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that the defendants knew that the beans
had been sold, with payment contingent on reliance on their certificate. They sent a copy to
the plaintiffs for the very purpose of inducing such action. In such circumstances assumption
of the task of weighing constituted the assumption of a duty to weigh carefully for the benefit
of all whose conduct was to be governed. Id.
35. 174 N.E. at 449-50.
36. We have examined the accounts of Fred Stem & Co. . . . and hereby certify
that the annexed balance sheet is in accordance therewith and with the informa-
tion and explanation given us. We further certify that. . . the said statement,
in our opinion, presents a true and correct view of the financial condition of
Fred Stern & Co .....
Id. at 442. The four types of opinions are the unqualified opinion, the qualified opinion, the
adverse opinion, and the disclaimer of opinion. An unqualified opinion is given when the
accountant finds that the statements: (1) fairly reflect results of operations, financial position,
and changes in financial position; (2) conform to generally accepted accounting principles,
applied on a consistent basis; and (3) fully disclose the necessary facts so as not to be mislead-
ing. A qualified opinion occurs when there is an "exception" or "subject to" clause because all
of the key criteria for an unqualified opinion are not fully met. The reasons for qualification
must be given. An adverse opinion is given when the statements do not reflect the results of
operations and financial position of the company. A disclaimer opinion occurs when the ac-
countant offers no opinion on the validity of the statements. Auditors must explain the reasons
for not giving an opinion. INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING, supra note 12, at 151-52.
37. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 442.
38. Id. at 444-48. The court however did allow liability for gross negligence. Id. at 449.
1985]
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mary purpose of the audit was for use by the company. 39 Whether or not
this attempt to distinguish these cases is valid, considering the fact that the
accountant furnished thirty-two copies of the audit, does not seem to be the
controlling issue.4 Arguably the true reason for the holding was a recogni-
tion that failure so to decide the case would result in unlimited liability for
the accounting profession. 41 The crucial inquiry, therefore, is whether the
fear of unlimited liability constitutes a valid reason for refusing to impose
liability. 42
A nonprivity plaintiff43 first successfully maintained an action against an
accountant for ordinary negligence in Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin." Rely-
ing on the defendant-accountant's audit, the plaintiff loaned money to the
defendant's client. The court found that this case more closely fitted the
Glanzer analysis than the decision in Ultramares because the ultimate goal of
the transaction was completion of an audit for use by the plaintiff rather
than by the client.4 5 The court proceeded to hold the accountant liable based
on two factors. First, the court ruled that, as between the negligent account-
ant and the innocent third party, the accountant should bear the loss. 46 Sec-
ond, the court noted that the accounting profession could more fairly spread
such losses by insuring against the risk and thereby passing the costs of neg-
39. Id. at 445-46.
40. Id. One commentator has argued that this distinction is invalid and that Cardozo was
aware of this at the time he wrote the opinion. Gormley, supra note 27, at 553-54. Cardozo
did note that the accountant knew that the audit would be relied upon by others. Ultramares,
174 N.E. at 442.
41. Chief Judge Cardozo stated:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to de-
tect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose ac-
countants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to
an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are
so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication
of a duty that exposes to these consequences.
Ultramares, 174 N.E.2d at 444.
Professor James explains his objections to the extension of liability to allow recovery for
indirect loss: "[T]he physical consequences of negligence usually have been limited, but the
indirect economic repercussions of negligence may be far wider, indeed virtually open-ended."
James, Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Ap-
praisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 45 (1972).
42. Many commentators make this argument. See Besser, supra note 4, at 527-28; Solo-
mon, supra note 4, at 86-89. Both commentators argue that fear of unlimited liability in itself
does not justify the negation of liability. Professor Besser contends that the requirement of
proof of proximate causation would limit indirect liability. Besser, supra note 4, at 526-27
n.79. Both commentators assert that insurance is available for the loss. See Besser, supra note
4, at 534-37; Solomon, supra note 4, at 86-89.
43. Privity occurs when the parties have a contractual relationship. 4 A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 778 (1951).
44. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968). "No appellate court, English or American has held an
accountant liable in negligence to reliant third parties not in privity." Id. at 90.
45. Id. at 91. The court also stated that the Glanzer principle applied to accountants
through the tentative drafts of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552. Id. This section states
that a maker of representations would be liable to "the person or one of a limited group of
persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the
recipient intends to supply it. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (Tent. Draft
No. 12, 1966).
46. 284 F. Supp. at 91-92.
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ligent accounting to the general public. 47 The Rusch opinion stated that the
accountant's duty, therefore, must extend not only to specifically foreseen
third parties but also to unknown members of a specifically foreseen and
limited class.48
Two courts recently extended the accountant's duty to include all foresee-
able parties.49 In Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler50 the plaintiffs alleged negligence
by the auditor in failing to detect a large-scale management fraud. 5' The
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the negligence count stated a valid
cause of action. 52 The court resolved the scope of liability issue solely on
public policy grounds. 53 The public policy analysis required balancing the
relationship between the parties, the type of risk involved, and the effect of
each outcome on the public interest. 54 The court ruled that this public pol-
icy analysis should prevail over any outdated concepts of privity 55 and irra-
47. Id.
48. Id. at 93. The court left unanswered the question of whether liability could be ex-
tended to the full range of foreseeability. Id. A distinction, therefore, exists between a specifi-
cally foreseen and a foreseeable standard. A specifically foreseen standard relates to a more
limited group. The accountant must have actual cause to know that certain identifiable per-
sons will rely on the financial statements. The foreseeable standard encompasses every person
that the accountant realizes at the time of the audit may rely on the statement in the future.
Gormley, supra note 27, at 540-58.
49. The broadening of the foreseeability standard was presaged by the Commonwealth
courts. In Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465, 471, the court in a
dictum recognized that an action would lie for negligent misrepresentation against account-
ants. This position was again taken by the British courts in J.E.B. Fasteners Ltd. v. Marks,
Bloom & Co., [1981] 3 All E.R. 289 (Q.B.). The court in Rosenblum cited both decisions. 461
A.2d at 142, 152, 153 n.14. The value of the British decisions as precedent is debatable. Three
factors mitigate against their relative value: (1) the British have a different procedural law that
deters the bringing of suits; (2) the British have a different corporate law; and (3) a different
common law history has evolved. Ebke, supra note 5.
50. 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
51. The plaintiffs began negotiations with the auditor's client for the acquisition of plain-
tiffs' business in exchange for stock in the client company. The plaintiffs relied on an unquali-
fied opinion of the client's worth made by the auditor in the prospectus. Two years after an
exchange of stock, the plaintiffs learned that the client had falsified its accounts, causing the
auditor's misstatement. The client company filed bankruptcy, and the plaintiffs' shares in the
client became worthless. In addition to their allegation of negligence the plaintiffs also charged
the auditor with fraudulent misrepresentation, gross negligence, and breach of warranty in the
audits. 461 A.2d at 140-41.
52. Id. at 155-56.
53. Id. at 140. The court seems to use "public policy" in the sense of maximizing society's
resources.
54. Id. at 147. California applied a similar balancing test in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d
647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958), a case involving an attorney's negligence. The court
considered:
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the fore-
seeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered in-
jury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the
policy of preventing future harm.
Id.
55. In the nineteenth century a party owed a duty of care only to the persons in privity
with him. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842)
(plaintiff, a driver of a mailcoach, denied recovery from defendant responsible for maintenance
of coach because they were not in privity). This privity doctrine slowly eroded until it met
with outright repudiation at the turn of the century. See, e.g., Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y.
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tional distinctions between types of harm.16
Applying the balancing test to the facts of the case, the court found no
reason why an innocent reliant party should bear a loss induced by a negli-
gent accountant. 7 Insurance enables the accountant to pass the loss on to
the entire consuming public. 8 Furthermore, the court concluded that
broadening accountant liability to include generally foreseeable third parties
would intensify the accountant's caution and thereby benefit the general
public.5 9 On these grounds the court held that public policy required expan-
sion of the scope of imposed liability.60
The latest decision, Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co.,61 is in
accord with the Rosenblum holding. The plaintiff bank sued the defendant
accounting firm for negligent misrepresentation in the audit of the defend-
ant's client. Relying on the audit, the bank loaned money to the client. The
client was actually insolvent at the time of the loan, and the bank sued the
accountants for their negligent misrepresentations. For substantially the
same reasons discussed by the Rosenblum court,62 the Wisconsin court also
imposed liability on the accounting firm,63 stating that the bank as a foresee-
able user of the audit should not suffer for its reliance. 64
C. Summary
Based on the preceding discussion, four reasons appear to explain why
396, 408-09 (1852) (exception to privity doctrine if human life was put in imminent danger);
Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470, 477 (1882) (privity doctrine not applicable because the negli-
gently constructed scaffold was a "trap"); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111
N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916) (persons owe a duty not to cause harm irrespective of privity); see also
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 96
(5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(b) (1965).
56. 461 A.2d at 145-47. One commentator has noted that economic harm can be just as
crippling as physical bodily harm. Comment, Third Party, supra note 4, at 604-05.
57. 461 A.2d at 153.
58. Id. at 151-53. The loss passes on to the public through the higher cost of goods or
services. The accountant's liability for his negligent misrepresentations to third parties will
translate into higher insurance premiums. The accountant must, therefore, charge more for
his service. The clients, wishing to maintain their profit margins, will charge a higher price for
their products in order to pay the increased auditing fees. The public, therefore, pays for the
negligent misrepresentations in the form of higher priced goods and services. See id. at 152.
59. Id. at 153.
60. See Besser, supra note 4, at 541-42. The accounting profession should bear the costs
of its negligence like any other industry. The traditional argument for insulating the account-
ant from a duty to third parties was that the audit's primary purpose was not for third-party
use. The accounting profession, then a fledgling industry, could not afford extended liability to
all possible third-party users. Now, however, the accounting industry is a multibillion dollar
industry, and the audit is designed for use by third parties. Enterprise liability, therefore,
should be imposed. See id.
61. 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983).
62. Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 147-52.
63. 335 N.W.2d at 365-66. The court held that the negligent party should suffer rather
than the innocent third party, that negligence should be deterred, and that loss spreading
demands the imposition of liability. Id. The court also noted a strong Wisconsin public policy
that holds a tortfeasor fully liable for all foreseeable consequences of his acts. Id. at 366.
64. The court did not impose liability, but instead remanded the case to explore these
public policy goals. Id. at 367. The court predetermined the imposition of liability since it
outlined how the policy factors should be weighed.
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courts should impose liability on accountants for their negligent acts. First,
the concept of enterprise liability demands that accounting firms, like all
other industries, should bear the costs of their negligent actions. Second, the
fault principle requires that the negligent accountant suffer the loss rather
than the reliant third party. Third, the theory of risk allocation dictates the
imposition of liability on accountants because the accountant may obtain
insurance and distribute the loss to the public. Finally, the doctrine of deter-
rence favors imposing liability so that the accountant will use a higher stan-
dard of care to avoid that liability.
II. THE DILEMMA
The courts discuss enterprise liability, fault, deterrence, and risk alloca-
tion and then state that these factors justify the imposition of liability. The
process is conclusory. The courts fail to explain why these factors are im-
portant or what facts support their conclusions. Instead, the courts should
have a methodology to justify these factors and the result.
The ease with which counter arguments can be made against these four
factors further demonstrates the need for a methodology. First, enterprise
liability and its underlying rationale may be inconsistent with risk allocation
principles. Liability should not lie on a person if another person can bear the
risk with less cost.65 Second, the fault rationale is similarly debatable. 66
Several authorities have criticized this factor as an improper reason to im-
pose liability.67 Third, the risk allocation justification appears less compel-
ling when one considers the fact that third parties can also buy insurance.68
Finally, alternate methods of accomplishing deterrence may exist. For ex-
ample, government regulation may achieve deterrence. 69 The following sec-
tion of the Comment attempts to provide the methodological support for
65. See Coase, supra note 8, at 19.
66. A factual question exists as to whether many of the third parties do indeed rely on the
financial statements. See Ebke, supra note 5.
67. See, e.g., Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656, 666-67
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence] (liability based upon fault does not
necessarily result in optimal deterrence of accidents); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 151, 151-52 (1973) (rejection of fault as basis for imposing liability). Cala-
bresi argues that the fault system cannot efficiently determine who should have avoided the
accident. In order for the fault system to be efficient either of two "incredible" assumptions
must be made. First, the victim class must be able to decide best whether accident avoidance is
worthwhile and accomplish best the worthwhile avoidance. Second, transaction costs must be
zero. See Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence, supra, at 666-67. For extensive readings on economic
and other approaches to the analysis of tort law, see R. RUBIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW
(2d ed. 1983).
68. See Ebke, supra note 5.
69. The government already has various mechanisms for punishing undesirable conduct
by accountants. For example, accountants can be sanctioned for fraud in the purchase and
sale of securities, see 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984), or for misstate-
ments or omissions in proxy statements, see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a)
(1984). The accountant could also be suspended or barred from practice before the Securities
and Exchange Commission. See 17 C.F.R. § 201-2(e) (1984); see also Marsh, Rule 2(e) Pro-
ceedings, 35 Bus. LAW. 987, 995-1002 (1980) (describing history, operation, statutory basis,
and constitutionality of rule 2(e)).
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these counter-arguments that the judicial justifications for general account-
ant liability have lacked to date.
III. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
If the courts seriously believe that accountants should be liable only if
public policy considerations demand imposition of liability,70 then an eco-
nomic perspective that examines the costs and benefits of imposing liability
should apply. 71 Accountants, rather than third parties, should bear the loss
only if such imposition minimizes the costs to society. 72 The methodology
used herein is basically a Calabresi model.73 The validity of using Cala-
bresi's analysis depends on whether negligent misrepresentation by the ac-
countant constitutes an accident. Calabresi never defines "accident";
however, one can infer that he tried to develop a broad methodology to
cover all occurrences that cause unintended harm.74 This Comment as-
sumes, therefore, that negligent misrepresentation constitutes an accident
within Calabresi's model. Application of this methodology to the problem
at hand involves determining whether imposition of liability on accountants
for any damage to third parties caused by the accountants' negligent acts
will produce a more efficient allocation of resources.
A. Who Should Bear the Risk?
Before determining whether accountants or third parties should bear the
risk of loss from negligent misrepresentations in an audited report, a thor-
ough understanding of the costs of accidents is necessary. Accidents and
accident prevention are questions of costs. 75 Two types of costs occur in the
accident context: the costs associated with the accident itself,76 and the
costs of preventing accidents. 77 Often the cost of avoiding the accidents will
exceed the actual cost of the accident. 78 In this situation the most efficient
70. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
71. See infra text accompanying note 113, which examines the justice constraint in Cala-
bresi's analysis.
72. Liability could be determined on the basis of fairness or justice. Determining liability
on the basis of fairness is nearly an impossible task. CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra
note 8, at 24-26. Defining "fair solution," is a very difficult task. Justice, therefore, should be
used as a constraint rather than as a basis for imposing liability. Id.
73. Calabresi has developed perhaps the most extensive model for determining who
should bear the costs of accidents. See, e.g., CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 8,
at 309-18; Calabresi, Views and Overviews, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 600, 610-11 [hereinafter cited as
Calabresi, Views and Overviews]; Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1084-85 (1972); Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence, supra note 67, at
666-71.
74. See CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 8, at 14-16. For example, Cala-
bresi's analysis has been applied to far-reaching problems of pollution. See Michelman, Pollu-
tion as a Tort.: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647 (1971).
75. Calabresi, Views and Overviews, supra note 73, at 600.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 86-89.
77. See Calabresi, Views and Overviews, supra note 73, at 600.
78. Actually the question is who should be allowed to harm whom. See Coase, supra note
8, at 2. For example, a rancher's cattle that stray onto a farmer's land pose a dilemma. If
society allows the cattle to eat the crops, then the farmer is harmed. On the other hand, the
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solution involves allowing the accident to occur. 79 Avoiding accidents at all
costs, therefore, should not be society's goal.80
Calabresi divides accident costs into three subcatagories: primary, secon-
dary, and tertiary costs. Primary costs directly result from the accident it-
self.81 The goal is to reduce primary costs through a reduction in the
number and severity of accidents.8 2 Society can accomplish this goal by
making accident-causing activities more expensive and thus less attractive. 83
The ideal solution would increase the cost of the activity to the extent of the
costs of the accident to reflect accurately the actual cost of the activity to
society.84 If the actual cost of the activity is known, then rational decision-
making determines whether or not to engage in the activity. Alternatively,
society could forbid the activity.8 5
Secondary costs include the societal costs resulting from the accident it-
self.86 These costs generally arise from economic dislocation or aggravation
of injury.8 7 Loss spreading may reduce secondary costs even after the pri-
mary costs have been reduced to a minimum.8 8 Calabresi points out that
adequate loss spreading could nearly eliminate secondary costs. 89
cost to the rancher of erecting fences to keep his cattle out of the farmer's field may outweigh
the cost to the farmer. In the accountant's situation the choice is between harming the ac-
countant by forcing him to undertake procedures to prevent negligent audits or allowing negli-
gent audits to harm the reliant third parties.
79. See Coase, supra note 8, at 18.
80. Avoiding accidents at all costs is one of Calabresi's three myths. Another is that
economic law provides absolute answers. To the contrary, society's values must be taken into
account when one is evaluating various solutions to problems. The third myth is that a neces-
sary financial link exists between the injurer and the victim. Sometimes neither the injurer nor
the victim will bear the cost of the accident. See CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra
note 8, at 17-23.
81. Professor Michelman explains primary costs as the "accident costs proper-the costs
which can be reduced only by terminating or altering one or more of the various activities
whose interaction culminates in the costly event called an accident." Michelman, Pollution as a
Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calebresi's Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 650 (1971).
82. Id.
83. This is the general deterrence approach. This approach allows the market to decide
which activities society shall engage in. See CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 8,
at 69. The underlying rationale is that each person knows his own needs. Therefore, each
person is best able to determine what activities he should engage in, provided he knows the
costs of participating in those activities. Id.
84. The goal is to know the cost of having independent auditors evaluate corporate
records for each party that conducts business with the company. If every cost that account-
ants impose on society could be quantified, these costs could be compared to the benefits they
confer. Obviously, if the costs are greater than the benefits, courts should not award damages
to third parties based on the accountant's negligence.
85. Societal prohibition is the specific deterrence approach. Under the specific deterrence
approach society collectively decides which activities should occur and to what extent. CALA-
BRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 8, at 68-69. Government regulations forbidding
certain behavior constitute an example of specific deterrence.
86. Id. at 39.
87. Calabresi does not include among secondary costs any resentment or demoralization
that might flow from a failure to compensate. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness.
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. Riv. 1165,
1214 (1967). These effects, if noted at all, would be considered under the justice constraints.
88. Loss spreading is the process of distributing a loss throughout society. See CALA-
BRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 8, at 21.
89. Id. at 39-45. Perfect loss spreading distributes the costs of all accidents evenly. Given
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Tertiary costs involve the frictional or transactional costs of operating so-
ciety's administrative or market machinery to control primary and secon-
dary costs.90 This category probably constitutes the most important cost. 91
Through an evaluation of the tertiary costs, society can determine whether
reduction of the number of accidents or reduction of the secondary effects of
accidents provides the cheaper solution. 92
Ideally, society should try to minimize the sum of the primary, secondary,
and tertiary costs of accidents. 93 The reduction of one category of costs,
however, may conflict with the reduction of another category of costs, and
thus complicate cost minimization. For example, if society chooses to re-
duce the secondary costs to zero, then neither the injurers nor the victims
will bear the cost of their activities.94 This will adversely affect primary costs
because the risk and the loss will be externalized.95 Neither the victim nor
the injurer will evaluate whether engaging in alternative activities would be
cheaper, since society, through loss spreading, bears the cost of the activity.
With the concept of accident costs firmly in mind, the next step in the
Calabresi approach involves an evaluation of who should bear the costs of
the accident. The person who can best reduce the costs of the accident
should bear the costs. 96 In the perfect society97 the initial cost bearer makes
perfect loss spreading, no secondary costs would exist; no one would have any change in in-
come because of the accident. See id. at 28.
90. CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 8, at 28.
91. Id. Calabresi believes that activities can be compared through the tertiary costs. The
cheapest cost avoider will probably be the one with the lowest transaction costs. See id.
92. Id. An example may help to explain these concepts. Suppose an accountant makes
negligent misrepresentations in the financial statements that cause harm to A and are borne
totally by him. The primary costs are the actual loss suffered by A. The secondary costs
include loss of income and status. For instance, A may have to sell his house. The tertiary
costs include the cost of negotiating, before the financial statements are prepared, who should
bear the loss.
93. Id. at 28. Two problems make the calculation of these costs difficult. First, defining
the cost of accidents is difficult. Second, market decisions for or against accidents are affected
by the income distribution in society. A poor man has less of a say than a rich man. The rich
man, therefore, has a disproportionate vote in the market. Finally, the market method may
create more expense than it's worth. See Calabresi, Views and Overviews, supra note 73, at 604-
05. A perfect allocation may never be reached because the transaction costs are prohibitive.
94. Reduction of secondary costs could occur if the government maintained a general
fund for accidents. Neither the injurer nor the victim would have an incentive to pay to pre-
vent accidents since the government would cover the cost of the accident. CALABRESI, COSTS
OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 8, at 144.
95. Externalization occurs when some costs of an activity are not born by the participants.
See id. This externalization leads to market inefficiency. The market does not encourage the
most efficient activity because the true costs of the activity are not accurately portrayed to the
parties. See id. Too much of an activity will exist when other people besides the users are
paying for a portion of the activity.
96. Ronald Coase has analyzed the problem of who should bear the costs as follows: The
cost should not always be put on the injurer because putting the cost on the injurer will allow
the victim to inflict harm on the injurer. "The real question that has to be decided is: should
A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more
serious harm." Coase, supra note 8, at 2.
Society could make the activity costless to both A and B by distributing the loss to society in
general. This solution would externalize the loss, which in turn would result in an inefficient
amount of the activity. See CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 8, at 144.
97. The concept of a perfect society is important for economists. The perfect society is a
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no difference. 98 If voluntary transactions were costless, i.e., if no tertiary
costs existed, then the injurer and the victim would bargain with each other
to achieve an efficient solution. If courts initially impose liability on the in-
jurer when liability should be on the victim because he can better avoid the
accident, then the injurer will pay the victim to assume the risk.99 The vic-
tim should readily accept the injurer's payment because the victim's overall
costs will decline.
In the real world, however, tertiary costs exist. Furthermore, not every-
one is in a position to bargain.1°° Calabresi believes that the cheapest cost
avoider,101 the party best able to evaluate the cost and risk of the accident
and act on that evaluation, should bear the cost and risk.10 2 Calabresi ar-
gues that the cheapest cost avoider concept constitutes the most efficient test
for imposing liability because society cannot evaluate the true costs of acci-
dents.103 A more efficient outcome results if the decision rests in the hands
of the persons who can more easily make the evaluation. °4 In short, the
easier choice involves determining who can best evaluate the costs rather
than determining what the costs of each alternative are and then placing
liability on the cheapest alternative.10 5
Choosing the cheapest cost avoider requires examination of three fac-
tors.10 6 First, who can evaluate the risk more precisely? 10 7 Second, who can
best prevent the risk from being externalized?108 Third, who can best reduce
the secondary cost of accidents through efficient loss spreading?10 9 The goal
is to place the cost on the independent activities that will result in the great-
society without tertiary costs. See Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence, supra note 67, at 657 n.5.
The value of the concept lies in the fact that the economist is able to reduce the variables in the
problem.
98. Coase, supra note 8, at 15.
99. Id. at 2-6.
100. Coase theorizes that every situation can be made into a bargaining transaction. Id. at
15. The transaction costs of turning every situation into a bargaining situation will often prove
too expensive, however. Id. at 15-16.
101. Calabresi defines the cheapest cost avoider as the party who is the "arbitrary initial
bearer of accident costs [who will] . . . find it most worthwhile to 'bribe' in order to obtain
that modification of behavior which would lessen accident costs most." CALABRESI, COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS, supra note 8, at 135. The most worthwhile bribe would be the one made by the
party "who is in the best position both to determine what accident cost avoidance measures
will result in the minimal sum of avoidance costs and accident costs. . . and to act upon that
determination." Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 73, at 1060 n. 19.
102. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 73, at 1060.
103. Calabresi supports this premise by comparing his test against the test formulated by
Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947),
which requires a determination of who can actually best reduce accident cost. Calabresi, Opti-
mal Deterrence, supra note 67, at 658.
104. Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence, supra note 67, at 658.
105. Id.
106. Calabresi makes distinctions between those people in a bargaining relationship and
those that are not and delineates factors for each group. See Calabresi, Views and Overviews,
supra note 73, at 605-07. These factors are substantially the same, however, as Calabresi read-
ily admits. Id. at 607.





est degree of internalization."10 Thus, the Calabresi analysis asks which cost
allocation will allow the party to know the true accident cost of the activity
and take the proper measure to reduce that accident cost."'
This analysis of who should bear the cost remains incomplete. Sometimes
society does not want to put the cost on a party in the interests of fairness.
An overarching justice constraint derives from society's values.'12 Unfortu-
nately, the worth of justice cannot be accurately quantified. This justice con-
straint is important when formulating the solution. Calabresi, however,
merely derives a system for measuring costs.' 13 The final decision of liability
must be made in light of this justice analysis and not conclusively based on
cost analysis alone.
B. An Additional Consideration: the Unique Character of Information
The nature of the accountant's task is the production of information from
company records." 4 Information is an unusual good because the producer
can rarely receive the full social value of the information due to the free
rider'15 problem.'16 In general information once produced can be repro-
duced to others at small cost. Once a third party receives the information,
he can reconvey the information at a low cost and thus adversely affect the
original producer's sale value to others. 1 7 Due to this low cost reproduc-
tion, the original producer of the information can never receive the full value
of his information."18 Since the producer is not fully compensated for the
information, he will produce an inefficiently low amount. 19
Society can produce an efficient amount of information through two possi-
ble means. First, society can attempt to require everyone who uses the infor-
mation to pay for it. The transaction costs of implementing this result
would be prohibitive in many situations and thus render this solution im-
110. Id. Internalization results when each activity bears its full costs. See id.
Ill. Id.
112. CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 8, at 24.
113. Michelman, supra note 81, at 647. This would be a constraint in the Calabresi analy-
sis. Due to a market inefficiency, the cost analysis would be erroneous and outside the con-
straints before the problem would even be analyzed.
114. See A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, AUDITING AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 1-3 (2d ed.
1980).
115. A free rider problem exists in all public goods. Characteristically, public goods are
reusable and not excludable from use by others. Since users can consume the good for "free,"
no incentive exists for them to pay for it. Thus, producers of public goods rarely receive full
value for the good. The classic example is national defense. The military protects everyone in
the country whether they want protection or not. Since everyone is automatically protected,
an incentive exists to let others pay for the costs because each person will receive the benefits in
any event.
116. R. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 151, 183 (1971); Bishop, Neg-
ligent Misrepresentation Through Economists' Eyes, 96 L.Q. REV. 360, 364 (1980).
117. Of course the legal system tries to protect some information through copyright and
patent laws.
118. Bishop, supra note 116, at 364.
119. Id. at 369. When the market does not produce an efficient amount, a market failure
occurs. "A market failure occurs when some factor ... prevents simple incentives to private
production from achieving an efficient use of society's resources . . . . Id. at 369 n.24.
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practicable. 120 Second, society can subsidize the information producers,
causing them to realize more fully the social value of their good. One com-
mentator has argued that such a subsidy actually occurs in negligent misrep-
resentation cases.1 21 Because society does not force information producers
to pay for the full social cost of their mistakes, 122 the information producers
have an incentive to produce greater amounts of information. In short, the
restricted liability subsidizes the producer of information. The subsidization
benefits society in general by causing a more efficient amount of information
to be produced. 123
IV. THE ACCOUNTANT AND COST AVOIDANCE
The question remains whether the accountant or the third parties should
bear the risk of loss induced by negligent misrepresentation. The solution
must be predicated on the above economic foundation. The Calabresi analy-
sis places liability on the accountant only if he is the better cost avoider.
Determining the better cost avoider requires a closer look at the elements of
a typical fact situation. First, studies of different liability situations reflect
that liability for negligence in an audit for a small business differs drastically
from liability for negligence in an audit for a large, publicly owned corpora-
tion. 124 Second, third parties fall into two distinguishable groups: (1) credi-
tors, which are usually banks; and (2) investors and shareholders. 125 In light
of these factors this part of the Comment evaluates which party constitutes
the best cost avoider in cases involving negligent misrepresentation of infor-
mation by accountants.
A. The Publicly Owned Corporation Versus the Small Business
Courts should not hold accountants liable for negligence in the audit of a
publicly owned corporation. First, the accountant cannot shift the costs of
the accident in the context of a public corporation because he cannot restrict
his opinion. Federal law requires the accountant to give an unqualified opin-
ion of the sufficiency of the audit.126 If the accountant is prohibited from
shifting the cost of the accidents, then by definition he cannot be the cheap-
est cost avoider. 127
Federal constraints on an accountant's ability to restrict his opinion may
constitute an insufficient reason, however, to insulate the accounting profes-
120. See id. at 378-79.
121. Bishop, supra note 116, at 365-66.
122. Id. at 366. Accountants are information producers.
123. The law should especially limit liability when (1) the information is valuable to many
potential users, (2) the information cannot be fully excluded from use, and (3) the imposition
of liability to all injured persons would lead to a discontinuance of the production of the infor-
mation. Id. at 378.
124. Professor Ebke argues that the accountant should have no duty to third parties in the
publicly owned corporate context. Ebke, supra note 5.
125. "Third parties" is an imprecise category. In order to make comparisons between the
third party and the accountant, the third party must be more precisely identified.
126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aa, 77g (1983).
127. CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 8, at 135.
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sion from liability. The legislature could have decided that the accountant is
in fact the cheapest cost avoider.1 28 In this case the accountant should bear
the burden of liability because Congress would have determined the account-
ant to be in the best position to achieve the ultimate goal of reducing the cost
of accidents. 129
The accountant, however, does not seem to be in a position to reduce costs
of accidents in the public corporation context because he cannot fairly evalu-
ate the risk. Since the potential number of third-party plaintiffs is virtually
limitless, any negligence in the audit could expose the auditor to unlimited
liability. ' 30 The accountant cannot evaluate the costs of the negligence and,
therefore, he cannot determine whether forgoing certain activities would be
economical.13' Since the accountant cannot determine the primary cost of
accidents, he is not in the best position to reduce such costs.
Second, although at first glance the accountant appears to have the capa-
bility to spread the losses and thereby reduce the secondary cost, an adverse
economic effect will result if the accountant does spread the losses. 132 As the
court in Rosenblum observed, the public will eventually bear the cost of the
negligence.1 33 The increased liability of the accQuntant will result in higher
fees, which the companies in turn will pass to the consumer in the form of
higher-priced products.' 34 The participants thus externalize the costs.' 35
128. Legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk
(1983) reveals no evidence that Congress meant to place liability on the accountant for mere
negligence. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976).
129. If Congress had so found, the result should be questioned. The collective approach
should only apply when society knows with certainty which party is the cheapest cost avoider.
Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence, supra note 67, at 670-71. Since the question of who should bear
the initial cost has troubled the courts and commentators for 50 years, any public certainty as
to risk allocation is doubtful. Under the Calabresi analysis, market deterrence should deter-
mine the outcome in uncertain cases. Id.
130. See supra note 41 (discussion of the unlimited potential third-party plaintiffs from
Ultramares). The foreseeable standard may have limits, but those limits are greatly extended
beyond any previous standard and are uncertain in scope. No rational method appears to limit
the number of potential plaintiffs in the situation of a negligent audit. In any event, having a
standard that is uncertain in scope leads to litigation and increased transaction costs.
131. The theory that unlimited liability potential would force the accountant to eliminate
mistakes is erroneous. Prevention of all accidents would consume a prohibitive amount of
resources, if possible at all. In fact, much doubt exists as to whether society currently has the
resources to avoid all accidents. A manpower shortage exists in the accounting profession.
Comment, supra note 15, at 694-95.
132. Justice constraints may also negate liability. For a discussion of the justice considera-
tions, see infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
133. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138, 153 (1983).
134. Increased audit costs could be deemed an additional necessary cost of producing
goods that the public should bear because the accountant has an integral place in the financial
system. All who benefit from that system should bear its costs. When the public bears the
costs, however, the accountant and the third parties lose their incentives to reduce accident
costs. In other words, the probability of externalization must negate this line of reasoning.
135. Another possible negative economic effect could occur. Only the larger auditing firms
could remain solvent because only they could distribute the losses. Comment, supra note 15,
at 698; see also McConnell, Are the Big 8 Increasing Their Share of the NYSE, AMEX and
OTC Audit Markets?, 7 J. ACCT., AUDITING & FIN. 178 (1983) (92% land market share in the
NYSE and 76% share in the AMEX is increasing). An oligopoly consisting of the "big eight"
accounting firms could, through price-fixing powers, extract a larger profit from society. Com-
ment, supra note 15, at 701.
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This result weighs against the accountant's bearing the risk. 13 6
Finally, the transaction costs in the publicly owned corporation context
are high. Use of a negligence standard will necessitate a complicated and
costly trial because the exposure to liability is so extensive that accounting
firms will likely defend each case with vigor. 137 The existence of negligence
will always be uncertain. The performance of an audit is an art; 1 38 therefore,
whether or not negligence has occurred turns on subjective interpretation.
Although third-party liability should not be imposed on the accountant in
the case of the large public corporation, public policy may dictate a contrary
result in the case of small businesses and closely held corporations. 139 One
can argue for a contrary result because liability is limited; the accountant
can foresee the number of plaintiffs and the extent of the liability. The ac-
countant, therefore, possibly can evaluate the primary costs. The account-
ant can better determine the cost of the injury and the cost of avoiding that
injury.
To counter this argument, analysis of the transaction costs weighs against
recognizing a duty of accountants to third parties in a small business situa-
tion. As in the public corporation setting, the participants will externalize
the cost of the accident, and the public will bear the cost in the long run.140
More importantly, the tertiary costs are even greater in the context of small
businesses than in the public corporation context. A greater incentive to
litigate exists because each party would contest the extent of the liability. If
unlimited liability existed, the policy for imposing the cost on the accountant
would be unjustified. Conversely, an imposition of a limited degree of liabil-
ity may be justifiable. The process of line drawing would prove difficult.
That the accountant is an expensive cost avoider follows from the preced-
ing analysis. If third parties are not in a superior position to evaluate and
bear the costs of negligence, however, such analysis is worthless. The next
section focuses on third parties as cost avoiders.
B. The Third Party as the Cheapest Cost Avoider
A negligent audit will potentially affect two distinguishable groups of per-
sons, creditors and investors. Investors seem to be in the best position to
evaluate primary costs. Each investor knows the extent of his liability from
the amount of his investment. Furthermore, the investor can evaluate
whether he or the accountant can better assume the risk of a negligent audit.
The investor may influence the contract for the accounting of the corpora-
136. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text (discussion on the inefficiency of
externalization).
137. The interest on the damages assessed would justify full legal battle. Most jurisdictions
do not allow pretrial interest to be collected as part of the damages. On a $10,000,000 claim
this amount could be quite substantial.
138. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (discussion of accounting as an art
rather than a science).
139. For definition of public policy, see supra note 6.
140. The availability of insurance is questionable. Compare Besser, supra note 4, at 534-37
(insurance readily available), with Comment, supra note 15, at 682-85 (insurance unavailable),
and Gormley, supra note 27, at 572 (insurance unavailable).
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tion so that the accountant assumes the risk of the negligent audit. 141 The
investor must decide whether paying the accountant a higher fee to assume
the risk of a negligent audit is more cost efficient than paying a lower fee and
personally assuming the risk.
If the investor assumes the risk, then no loss spreading will occur. The
investor, however, had the choice of not bearing the risk 142 and can reduce
the secondary costs to zero if he so chooses by paying the accountant to bear
the risk of loss.
Additionally, tertiary costs would diminish if third parties assumed the
risk of negligent audits. Each party knows his position. Transaction costs
will be reduced if each party has an expectation of the liabilities. 143 If the
investor decides to assume the risk of damage stemming from a negligent
audit, no incentive exists for him to litigate if the accountant is only negli-
gent. If the accountant has assumed liability for damage flowing from his
negligence, the result in a subsequent negligence suit against the accountant
will be more predictable. 1 Since the investor paid the higher price, the
accountant will realize that doubts will probably be resolved against him. In
sum, the investor is a cheaper cost avoider than .the accountant.
Creditors are usually banks. Although banks know the exact amount of
their loss if a negligent audit takes place, they have a greater control prob-
lem. Banks have very little control over who performs the audit and who
bears the risk. 145 The lack of control over primary costs is offset, however,
by greater control over secondary and tertiary costs. Banks can readily
spread losses throughout society by writing off bad loans as a cost of doing
business. 146 Banks' tertiary costs are less for the same reasons the investor's
tertiary costs are less. If banks expect that they cannot recover damages
resulting from negligent audits, then banks will not litigate the question, and
costly trials will be avoided. Banks may also contractually shift the risk of a
negligent audit to the accountant. The accountant, on the other hand, can-
141. Whether or not an investor or shareholder could control the selection of an auditor
remains to be seen. In the case of shareholders, however, an argument could be made that
they do have a degree of control. Shareholders could unite and dictate the choice of the ac-
counting firm to the corporation. See Ebke, supra note 5. If this option is not available, then
the shareholder assumes the risk of a negligent audit.
142. Whether society wishes to spread the risk is debatable. See infra notes 148-52 and
accompanying text (discussion of justice considerations).
143. Bishop, supra note 116, at 371-72.
144. The number of suits is increasing. This increase can be traced to the relaxed liability
standards. See Minow, supra note 16, at 76; Comment, supra note 15, at 676-77.
145. Creditors, however, unlike accountants, at least know the amount at risk. From this
standpoint creditors seem to be in a slightly better position than the accountant to evaluate the
primary costs.
146. The subcategorization is less than ideal. Calabresi describes subcategorization using
an automobile example. Liability for cars is based on the different models of cars. The higher
risk cars cost more because they cause more accidents. Yet the other subcategories, age of
driver and driving record, etc., would not be reached with models of cars bearing their relative
costs. Calabresi, Views and Overviews, supra note 73, at 606. In the accountant's case the
losses sustained by the bank from reliance on a negligent audit would be grouped with other
bad loans. The deterrent effects of the negligent audit are effectively lost, with the result an




not shift the risk to the creditors without incurring prohibitive transaction
costs. 147 Although the case is less clear, creditors generally should be able to
bear the risks better than the accountants.
C. Constraints
Additional considerations lead to the conclusion that accountants should
not be held liable for their negligent audits. First, even if the Calabresi
model leads to the imposition of liability to third parties, the justice con-
straint should prevent this result. If courts hold accountants liable to third
parties, then society will subsidize the losses.148 This subsidization occurs
because society will pay for any losses incurred by third parties due to the
negligent audit through loss spreading. This result is contrary to the free
market system. If a person engages in an enterprise for profit, he should also
have to bear any losses that occur.' 49 Society should not have to bear the
losses when it will also not share in the profits. 150
The second constraint arises from the fact that accounting involves infor-
mation. 51 Since the accountant produces a public good, efficiency dictates
that society subsidize the full social costs of this activity. Limited liability
for the accountant accomplishes this goal.1 52
V. SCIENTER
To say that the accountant has no duty for negligent misrepresentation
does not mean that the accountant can make mistakes with impunity. The
policy of not imposing liability is based on the concept of accidents. The
accountant should pay for any errors made with scienter' 53 or intent. Third
147. Every situation is potentially a bargaining situation. Often the extent of the transac-
tion costs will make bargaining unpractical. Coase, supra note 8, at 15-16. Similarly, the
accountant faces high transaction costs and therefore is not in a bargaining situation with the
third parties. In most situations the accountant will not know who the creditors are or how
many creditors will rely on the audited financial statements.
148. One commentator has termed this an "individualizing of the profits" and "a social-
izing of the losses." Ebke, supra note 5.
149. This argument is especially true for the investor. He invests for the purpose of profit.
The author can see no reason why society should subsidize his unfortunate investments.
150. A distinction exists in this situation between physical injury and economic injury.
Physical injury is usually not bargained for; on the other hand economic injury in the form of a
decrease in the value of investment is a known possibility. Ventures for profit should be
treated differently from the unavoidable automobile accident. See also supra note 41 (courts
should take pragmatic approach to economic losses).
151. Information is a public good. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
152. This argument is somewhat weak since many other courses of action could also
achieve subsidization of information production. Limited liability as a subsidy may not be
desirable since society as a whole benefits from the production of information, yet only a lim-
ited class bears the costs of the subsidy. The third parties, however, are the primary users of
the information. Therefore, an unreasonable result does not occur by making them pay the
subsidy. In addition, limited liability may be the most politically expedient method of making
the subsidy. For example, the government could give a direct subsidy to all information pro-
ducers. If the government tried to give money directly to accounting firms, one could only
imagine the taxpayer uproar.
153. Scienter as defined by Ultramares requires intent to deceive. Ultramares v. Touche,
255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 447 (1931). This standard is the liability requirement in most
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parties cannot foresee when audits will be made in bad faith and therefore
should not have to bear the costs of the errors. In addition, the wrongdoer is
in the best position to prevent willful departures from fact.
Since the term accident connotes an unavoidable event, a reckless disre-
gard for the truth would not qualify as an accident. 154 When an accountant
displays a reckless disregard for the truth, a court should hold that this dis-
regard meets the requirement of scienter. 155 Imposing a broad definition of
scienter should deter the accountant from making bad faith audits. More
importantly, public policy demands this result.
VI. CONCLUSION
Accountants should be liable to third parties only for acts committed with
scienter. Public policy does not support holding accountants liable for negli-
gent acts. Imposing the risk of liability on third parties for accountants'
negligence produces a more efficient use of society's resources. Furthermore,
spreading the losses of a profitable enterprise while individualizing the prof-
its seems unfair. In any event, if the courts choose to base their decisions on
public policy analysis, the courts should more thoroughly develop an analyt-
ical framework that accounts for the dimensions of public policy outlined in
this Comment.
states. The court in Ultramares held that a showing of gross negligence was necessary in order
to maintain a cause of action against the accountant. 174 N.E. at 449.
154. Professor Ebke argues that liability should attach when a reckless disregard of the
truth occurs. Ebke, supra note 5.
155. The Supreme Court has also said that scienter must be shown for all cases brought
under the securities laws. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). The Court
delined to decide whether recklessness is sufficient grounds for civil liability. Id. at 193 n. 12.
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